Teaching Citizens to Reduce Violent Crime
Research
The Effect of Citizens' Concealed Carry on Crime Rates
Few people argue that police presence doesn't deter crime, nor do many debate the wisdom of teaching awareness of one's surroundings. Learning methods for defusing emotional situations is considered simple common sense. However, discussing carrying firearms for protection is taboo, and the idea that we are safer when our law-abiding members are armed, provokes cries of outrage and disbelief. It should not, for there is ample evidence that good, armed citizens reduce violent crime.
Notes on Studies Cited
Studies cited are selected for three reasons. One, they are scientific in nature, as opposed to anecdotal or simple emotional appeals. Two, they address crime prevention. Third, they do not argue the law surrounding the Second Amendment to the US Constitution. The right to carry a concealed firearm is currently available in Texas and many other states, so the politics of the Second Amendment aren't topics that require addressing here. Whether concealed handgun licenses reduce violent crime is relevant, and is addressed here.
Primary Research
Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns
Criminal Deterrence, Geographic Spillovers, And Right-To-Carry Concealed Handguns
Analysis of Primary Research
The Effect of Concealed Weapons Laws: An Extreme Bound Analysis
Testing For The Effects Of Concealed Weapons Laws: Specification Errors And Robustness
Does The Right To Carry Concealed Handguns Deter Countable Crimes? Only A Count Analysis Can Say
Privately Produced General Deterrence
The Impact of Gun Laws on Police Deaths
Using Placebo Laws to Test “More Guns, Less Crime”
Primary Research
Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns
John R. Lott, Jr. and David B. Mustard
The Journal of Legal Studies,Volume 26, Number 1, January 1997
Abstract
Using cross-sectional time-series data for U.S. counties from 1977 to 1992, we find that allowing citizens to carry concealed weapons deters violent crimes, without increasing accidental deaths. If those states without right-to-carry concealed gun provisions had adopted them in 1992, county- and state-level data indicate that approximately 1,500 murders would have been avoided yearly. Similarly, we predict that rapes would have declined by over 4,000, robbery by over 11,000, and aggravated assaults by over 60,000. We also find criminals substituting into property crimes involving stealth, where the probability of contact between the criminal and the victim is minimal. Further, higher arrest and conviction rates consistently reduce crime. The estimated annual gain from all remaining states adopting these laws was at least $5.74 billion in 1992. The annual social benefit from an additional concealed handgun permit is as high as $5,000.
Note: This paper was later expanded into a book, covering a longer time series and with metropolitan-level data unavailable in the original work. The book's citation is: More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun Control Laws, 2nd Ed., John R. Lott, Jr., The University of Chicago Press, 2000.
Criminal Deterrence, Geographic Spillovers, And Right-To-Carry Concealed Handguns
Stephen G. Bronars and John R. Lott, Jr.
American Economic Review, Vol. 88, no. 2, May 1998
Abstract
Increased law enforcement or penalties may deter crime, but they may also cause criminals to move to other crimes or other areas. This paper examines whether the adopting a shall issue concealed weapons law in one state alters crime in neighboring areas. The benefits that a county obtains from it's state passing a shall issue concealed handgun law are generally stronger than those found in previous work. Spillover effects on neighboring areas are almost always deleterious. Criminals tend to move across communities more readily in response to changes in concealed handgun laws than in response to changes in arrest rates. The spillover effects are surprisingly large, especially for property crimes, thus questioning existing research which ignores these considerations. The spillovers are immediate and increase over time (with the exception of assaults and auto theft). Except for rapes, the negative effects of a neighbor's law are mitigated by having one's own state adopting the law. Taken together these results imply that concealed handguns deter criminals and that the largest reductions in violent crime will be obtained when all the states adopt these laws. We find little evidence that increased arrest rates create similar spillovers.
Analysis of Primary Research
The Effect of Concealed Weapons Laws: An Extreme Bound Analysis
William Alan Bartley and Mark A. Cohen
Economic Inquiry, 1998, vol. 36, issue 2, pages 258-65
Abstract:
John R. Lott and David B. Mustard (1997} provide evidence that enactment of concealed handgun ('right-to-carry') laws deters violent crime and induces substitution into property crime. A critique by Dan A. Black and Daniel S. Nagin (1998) questions the particular model specification used in the empirical analysis. In this paper, the authors estimate the 'model uncertainty' surrounding the model specified by Lott and Mustard using an extreme bound analysis (Edward Leamer 1983). They find that the deterrence results are robust enough to make them difficult to dismiss as unfounded, particularly those findings about the change in violent crime trends. The substitution effects are not robust with respect to different model specifications. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.
The Impact of Gun Laws on Police Deaths
David B. Mustard
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XLIV (October 2001)
Abstract:
This paper uses state-level data from 1984–96 to examine how right-to-carry laws and waiting periods affect the felonious deaths of police. Some people oppose concealed weapons carry laws because they believe these laws jeopardize law enforcement officials, who risk their lives to protect the citizenry. This paper strongly rejects this contention. States that allowed law-abiding citizens to carry concealed weapons had a slightly higher likelihood of having a felonious police death and slightly higher police death rates prior to the law. After enactment of the right-to-carry laws, states exhibit a reduced likelihood of having a felonious police death rate and slightly lower rates of police deaths. States that implement waiting periods have slightly lower felonious police death rates both before and after the law. Allowing law-abiding citizens to carry concealed weapons does not endanger the lives of officers and may help reduce their risk of being killed.
Privately Produced General Deterrence
Bruce L. Benson and Brent D. Mast
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XLIV (October 2001)
Abstract:
In this study, we use county data on private security establishments and employment for 1977–92 to test two hypotheses. First, we test whether private security deters crime. Second, we test whether John Lott and David Mustard's estimates of the impact of shall-issue laws on crime are biased because of a lack of controls for private security. We find little evidence that private security reduces the crime rates for assault or larceny. Some estimates suggest murder, robbery, and/or auto theft may be deterred by private security, although these results are not robust. Of all the index crime categories, only rape is estimated to have a consistent negative relationship with private security. In addition, we find little evidence that the Lott and Mustard results are biased because of a lack of controls for the private security measures employed in this study.
Does The Right To Carry Concealed Handguns Deter Countable Crimes? Only A Count Analysis Can Say
Florenz Plassmann and T. Nicolaus Tideman
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XLIV (October 2001)
Abstract:
An analysis of the effects of right-to-carry laws on crime requires particular distributional and structural considerations. First, because of the count nature of crime data and the low number of expected instances per observation in the most appropriate data, least-squares methods yield unreliable estimates. Second, use of a single dummy variable as a measure of the nationwide effect of right-to-carry laws is likely to introduce geographical and intertemporal aggregation biases into the analysis. In this paper, we use a generalized Poisson process to examine the geographical and dynamic effects of right-to-carry laws on reported homicides, rapes, and robberies. We find that the effects of such laws vary across crime categories, U.S. states, and time and that such laws appear to have statistically significant deterrent effects on the numbers of reported murders, rapes, and robberies.
Testing For The Effects Of Concealed Weapons Laws: Specification Errors And Robustness
Carlisle E. Moody
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XLIV (October 2001)
Abstract:
In 1997, John Lott and David Mustard published an important paper in which they found that right-to-carry concealed weapons laws reduce violent crime. Although Lott and Mustard appear to do all possible variations of the analysis, a closer reading reveals that the study might suffer from several possibly important errors. I reestimate the model and check for incorrect functional form, omitted variables, and possible second-order bias in the t-ratios. Lott and Mustard's basic conclusions are generally robust with respect to these potential econometric problems. Overall, right-to-carry concealed weapons laws tend to reduce violent crime. The effect on property crime is more uncertain. I find evidence that these laws also reduce burglary.
Using Placebo Laws to Test “More Guns, Less Crime”
Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok
Economic Analysis & Policy, 2004, Vol. 4 : Iss. 1, Article 1.
Abstract:
We reexamine Mustard and Lott’s controversial study on the effect of “shall-issue” gun laws on crime using an empirical standard error function randomly generated from “placebo” laws. We find that the effect of shall-issue laws on crime is much less well-estimated than the Mustard and Lott (1997) and Lott (2000) results suggest. We also find, however, that the cross equation restrictions implied by the Lott-Mustard theory are supported. A boomlet has occurred in recent years in the use of quasi-natural experiments to answer important questions of public policy. The intuitive power of this approach, however, has sometimes diverted attention from the statistical assumptions that must be made, particularly regarding standard errors. Failing to take into account serial correlation and grouped data can dramatically reduce standard errors suggesting greater certainty in effects than is actually the case. We find that the placebo law technique (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2002) is a useful addition to the econometrician’s toolkit.